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Measuring Market Power as Competition 
Over Time 
Michael L. Marlow and George E. Wright 
This paper suggests that the empirical measurement of market structure, particularly the 
reliance on concentration indexes as an indicator of noncompetitive market power, does not 
adequately reflect recent advances in theory. This paper integrates the literature of the 
interaction between market structure and firm behavior with dynamic measures of structure. 
Our estimation for the savings and loan industry suggests that continued application of 
traditional static measures in market structure-performance studies are apt to be misleading. 
We call for more investigation into measures of dynamic structure. 
I. Introduction 
While market structure affects market performance, empirical studies have not always found a 
relationship between indicators of performance (e.g., profitability) and market structure, as 
represented by indexes of concentration. I Yet such indexes playa prominent role in antitrust 
regulation. Antitrust policy, then, faces two problems: doubt as to whether concentrated 
industries actually perform poorly, and a lack of criteria for choosing from among alternative 
indexes. 2 
One reason for these problems is that empirical measures of market structure, especially 
indexes of concentration, have not kept up with the theory of industrial organization. While 
recent studies emphasize the dynamic evolution of markets as the. key to predicting firm 
behavior and market outcomes, empirical measures of concentration typically focus on static 
market structure at one point in time. 
While empirical research can incorporate some of these dynamic elements in an ad hoc 
way, regulation concerning mergers and acquisitions tends to rely on simple, standardized 
indicators of concentration. We argue that such indicators may have misleading implications 
for public policy. 
Using the savings and loan industry as an example, this paper seeks to integrate the 
literature of the interaction between market structure and firm behavior with dynamic 
measures of market structure. Section II summarizes the literature on traditional measures of 
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structure, and Section III discusses previously-used measures of dynamic structure. Section 
IV presents first approximations of dynamic measures of market structure. Results of 
estimations of the market structure-profitability relation with both static and dynamic 
structure measures are in Section V. Section VI closes with public policy implications and 
recommendations for future research. 
II. Traditional Measures of Concentration and Market Structure 
In seeking to tie industrial performance to market structure, early work with simple-sum 
concentration ratios led to full-distribution measures-notably the entropy, Hirschman­
Herfindahl and Hall-Tideman indexes. Indeed, the Justice Department adopted the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index as the "official" measure of concentration on the grounds that 
its consideration of all firms and disproportional weighting of large-share firms "probably 
accords with their relative importance in any collusive interaction." (U.S. Department of 
Justice 1982, p. 17) The Justice Department's merger guidelines establish fixed cut-off values 
of 1000 and 1800 with industries below or above these values respectively classified as 
"unconcentrated" and "highly concentrated." Recent clarification of Justice Department 
policy has strengthened the use of the 1800 cut off value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
in the evaluation of bank mergers and acquisitions. 3 
Despite this use of concentration indexes in regulatory policy, studies of the relationship 
between structure and performance have not found a consistent relationship between 
performance and concentration. In financial markets, a survey by Heggestad (1979) concludes 
that "The concentration-profitability relationship in banking has been found to be quite weak, 
which is surprising, since many studies find that price and non-price competition is affected by 
concentration." Evidence for the traditional hypothesis of a direct relation between 
concentration and profitability may be found in Edwards (1965), Kaufman (1966), Verbrugge 
and Shick (1976), and Heggestad (1977). Contrasting evidence is presented in Bryan (1972), 
Ware (1972), and Yeats (1974). 
One possible reason for the lack of a strong empirical relationship between concentration 
and profitability is that the indexes used to measure market structure may fail to capture the 
dynamic evolution of a market. In "creative destruction," (Schumpeter 1950; Nelson and 
Winter 1982), the process whereby innovators challenge the market power of dominant firms 
depends not so much on a dominant firm's share, but on how fast that share is eroded. The 
emphasis on entry barriers in Bain (1956) views market power as a function of the ability to 
maintain noncompetitive structure over time. One implication of the empirical literature on 
entry barriers is that a snapshot picture of different markets at one point in time may be able to 
explain entry as a function of barriers, yet there may be no simple relation between 
performance measures (e.g., profitability) and existing static market structure. For example, a 
concentrated market may exhibit high or low profitability depending upon whether or not its 
members have had to allocate resources to resist entry efforts. 
The importance of changes in market structure is strengthened by the findings of Shepherd 
(1979) and others who find that profitability of individual firms is more a function of their own 
market than the average characteristics of the market as a whole. 4 The importance of firm 
3 The original guidelines allowed possibility of challenges to post-merger Hirschman-Herfmdahl scores of less than 
1800. In banking markets, however, this rarely occurred, and an additional criterion of an increase is at least 200 points 
has further limited the scope of challengers. High index scores by themselves do not constitute the only grounds for 
regulatory challenge. (Kolatch 1985; Burke 1984) 
4 See Shepherd (1979, Ch. 13) for a review of these studies. More recent research by Schmalensee (1985) 
has, however, suggested that characterizations of the market as a whole may be very important. 
shares also implies that changes in relative position are crucial in determining performance. 5 
Emphasis on the individual firm's position in the market has fostered research on the relation 
between intra-market strategic group concentration and performance. 6 That is, behavior 
depends both on average concentration, and the degree to which smaller "outgroup" 
members can challenge the members of the dominant oligopoly core. 7 
The "uprising" theory of contestable markets in Baumol (1982) argues that free entry and 
exit are the prime determinants of contestability. Actual and potential entrants, not the lack of 
concentration in market shares, discipline incumbents. Among financial institutions, an 
existing firm may suddenly change behavior and act like one of Baumol's "hit-and-run" 
raiders. 8 Merger with another firm, acquisition by a holding company, or a sudden shift in 
management can lead a small firm to challenge the position of the dominant oligopoly core. 
In the same vein, Brozen's (1982) survey of concentration and performance attacks the 
"naive" notion that the number of firms or the distribution of market shares has consistent 
effect on the performance of an industry. Brozen (1982) argues that social costs and benefits 
of concentration can be evaluated only by tracing the evolution of market performance over 
time. 
III. Dynamic Measures of Concentration 
Despite the theoretical emphasis on evolution over time as the key to performance and 
scattered calls for dynamic measures of market structure, there has been little empirical work 
to operationalize the approach. 9 In financial markets, a few papers have examined empirical 
relations between changes in measures of market structure and performance. Graddy (1980) 
finds that, regardless of initial levels of structure, changes in deposit shares of dominant firms 
are important determinants of performance. Marlow (1983a) finds that increases in both de 
novo and branching entry by commercial banks and savings and loans improve performance. 
More important in terms of measuring concentration, Rose and Fraser (1976) find no 
evidence of a relation between performance and changes in simple-sum concentration, 
Herfindahl, or share stability indexes. 
Simply measuring the net change in existing static indexes is unlikely to capture the key 
evolutionary aspects of market structure. An index which seeks to summarize the degree of 
anticompetitive potential should reflect dynamic aspects. An adequate measure should 
represent the degree of active competition among firms for top positions in a market. While 
competition may be affected by the size of market share held by the largest firms, the potential 
for movement in and out of the top positions is of primary importance to competitive 
behavior. Such indicators of competitive structure are "dynamic," as opposed to 
comparative-static indexes of concentration. 10 
IV. First Approximations of Dynamic Structure 
We consider two dynamic measures of structure: mobility and turnover over specified time 
periods. These measures are dynamic, in that different positionings or orderings of 
5 The authors are indebted to Professor William Shepherd for this observation. 
6 See Newman (1978), Porter (1979), and Allen (1983). 
7 See Scott (1980) for some evidence suggesting the importance of this effect. 
8 See Caves and Porter (1977). 
9 We discuss the many problems with current popular indices in Marlow and Wright (1986). 
10 These measures of "dynamic" structure have been discussed before; e.g., see Scherer (1980, p. 73-76). 
competitors over time are associated with different levels of competition. The following 
definitions (with respect to deposit volume) are used. II Mobility (M) is the number of 
changes in rank that occur among the three largest finns in a SMSA. Turnover (T) measures 
the number of times that finns below the top three move into the top three in a SMSA. 
We argue that a large change in the rank ordering of firms reflects a high level of 
competition that ultimately reduces profitability. This argument implies one-way casuality 
which runs from our measures of competitive structure to profitability. Whether or not such 
confrontations over market share result from declining or increasing total market strength. the 
actions of aggressive management in a stable market or just basic instinctive behavior really 
do not affect the argument. The important issue is that challenges to the dominant firms are 
crucial to the measurement of competition. 
There are two potential problems with our measurement of market power. Similar 
measures of mobility and turnover have been applied in market structure-performance studies 
of financial markets. However, they have always been employed as performance (dependent) 
variables. 12 Heggestad and Rhoades (1976), Rhoades (1980), and Rhoades and Rutz (1981) 
use data for commercial banks, while Marlow (1983b) and Marlow, Link and Trost (1984) 
use data for savings and loans. While mobility and turnover are inversely correlated with 
profitability (Marlow 1983b), the question of whether these variables are endogenous or 
exogenous has not been specifically addressed in the literature. However, since conventional 
microeconomics argues that competition affects profitability, it seems reasonable to assume 
that our dynamic measures of competitiveness are exogenous determinants of profitability. 
Causality from profitability to dynamic structure measures would imply that our structure 
measures are endogenous. For example, finns operating with low profits could reduce their 
operating size, thus affecting the magnitude of our measures of structure. We cannot dismiss 
the possibility that causality could run both ways. 13 However, this issue is equallty pertinent to 
the modeling of traditional relations between performance and market structure. Placing our 
measures on the right-hand side of the equation does not prove that they are exogenou.,. 
However, antitrust regulation assumes that high levels of concentration cause noncompetitive 
behavior. Exploration of a simultaneous determination of market structure is left for future 
research. 
V. Estimation of Market Structure-Profitability Relations 
The empirical model, which is estimated by a linear regression model with 124 observations, 
is 
P = f(MSs or MSD, OPEX, LIQ, PCY, PP, CBP, Dl, D2) (1) 
II We have also used five firms, in place of three, as the cut off number for these definitions but this does not 
alter the results below. 
12 Studies using mobility and turnover measures in nonfinancial markets include Kaplan (1954), Friedland 
(957), Hymer and Pashigian (1962), and Boyle and Sorenson (1971). However, due to limited availability of 
rnicrodata, they tend to estimate market structure-performance relations for large groupings of industries. 
IJ One may be able to describe circumstances that suggest opposite causality from the direction assumed here. 
For example, those SMSAs with relatively low profits may represent SMSAs where exogenous shocks have hit 
large firms that represent large numbers in the market profit data. In this case, it is possible that their depressed 
profits lower the market figure and, consequently, this exogenous profit shock would produce negative signs on 
the coefficients on mobility and turnover. 
where: 
P = net income before taxes/total assets in 1979 14 
MSs: static measures of market structure
 
CR3 = 3-finn concentration ration in 1979 15
 
= H = Herfindahl index in 1979
 
MSD : dynamic measures of market structure
 
= DCR3 = change in CR3 from 1977-1979
 
= DH = change in H from 1977-1979
 
M3 = mobility among 3 largest finns for 1976-1979
 
T3 = turnover among 3 largest finns for 1976-1979
 
OPEX	 operating expenses [(office occupancy + salaries + advertising)/total assets 
in 1979] 16 
LIQ	 cash and investment securities/total assets in 1979 
PCY	 per capita income in 1979 
PP =	 percentage change in population from 1970-1979 
CBP	 number of commercial banks per capita in 1979 
Dl =	 1, if SMSA is in the West,
 
0, otherwise, and
 
ill 1, if SMSA is in the East,
 
= 0, otherwise.
 
Finn data, except CBP, are for all insured savings and loans for a cross section of 124 
SMSAs over the period 1976-1979. 17 The choice of the 124 SMSAs is based solely on data 
availability and the criterion that each SMSA has more than five savings and loans in 1979. 18 
A cut-off of three finns is necessary due to the definition of T: with less than four firms, T 
must always be zero. Therefore, for SMSAs with less than four finns, the value of T = °does 
not provide a measure of economic significance. 19 The reduced-fonn of Equation (I) is 
chosen since it is consistent with previous studies and provides estimation of the net effects of 
explanatory variables on profitability. 20 
14 An alternative measure of profitability (net income/total assets) did not substantially alter the results below. 
15 Due to space limitations, only CR3 is displayed here. However, one-to-five firm concentration ratios were 
used and all of these yielded the same results when estimated in Equation 1. 
16 It is noted that in a detailed simultaneous model, OPEX may be endogeneously determined with P. 
17 Data on savings and loans obtained from Summary of Savings Accounts by Geographic Area and 
unpublished reports of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Other data are obtained from Summary of 
Accounts and Deposits, and Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
18 The original sample consisted of 153 SMSAs. However, due to various data omissions and the requirement 
that each SMSA have more than three finns, the final sample consists of 124 SMSAs. The following points suggest 
that there exists little potential for serious sample selection bias. The chosen sample represents a relatively large sample 
when considered in the context of previous studies of the savings and loan industry. For example, see Marlow (1982) 
with III SMSAs and Marlow, Link, and Trost (1984) with 99 SMSAs. Moreover, the number of SMSAs with three 
or fewer finns is only 15 out of the original sample of 153 SMSAs; the other deletions from the sample result from 
omissions of other data, Finally, running the regressions without the restriction that there must be at least three fmns 
per SMSA (139 SMSAs) does not generate significant changes in the coefficients and significant levels in any 
independent variable. 
19 This issue is discussed in Marlow, Link, and Trost (1984). 
;!() For previous studies of profitability in the savings and loan industry, see Verbrugge and Shick (1976), Verbrugge, 
Shick, and Thygerson (1976), SpeUman (1981) and Marlow (1983c). 
Profitability P is measured as net income before taxes/total assets. Static and dynamic 
measures of market structure (MSs and MSD ) are used to measure the impacts of structure on 
profitability. Static measures are the three-firm concentration ratio CR3 and the Herfindahl 
index H. Dynamic measures are changes in the traditional static measures DCR3 and DH 
and our suggested dynamic measures M and T. Due to data availability, DCR3 and DH are 
for the period 1977-1979 and M and T are for 1976-1979. Past studies have expected a 
positive relation to exist between static measures (CR3 and H) and profitability P. 
Past studies have expected positive relations between profitability and changes in static 
measures DCR3 and DH; however, we argued above that, similar to the problems associated 
with CR3 and H, these measures may not be expected to have a significant influence on 
profitability. Mobility M and turnover T should be negatively related to profitability. 
Operating expenses OPEX should be negatively related to profitability. Cash and 
investment securities divided by assets, LIQ is a measure of liquidity and should exert a 
negative effect on profitability. Demand variables PCYand PP should be positively related to 
profitability . 
The number of commercial banks per capita CBP are controlled because they compete 
with savings and loans for deposits. 21 To a lesser extent, commercial banks also compete with 
savings and loans in various loan markets. Because greater numbers of commercial banks per 
capita should exert stronger competitive forces in markets, a negative relation between CBP 
and profitability is expected. 22 
Dummies Dl (West Coast) and m (East Coast) control regional differences in 
profitability. These may include age of loan portfolio and differences in income and 
population growth. For example, faster growth on the West Coast may be reflected in 
younger loan portfolios for the West Coast with higher yields. In addition, more rapid 
population and income growth on the West Coast should exert relatively favorable impacts on 
profitability. For these reasons DI and D2 should carry positive and negative signs, 
respectively. 23 
Table I displays the regression results for equations with static measures of market 
structure, with and without regional dummies. Operating costs OPEX exert negative and 
statistically significant impacts ,on profitability for the equations with the regional dummies. 
Liquidity LIQ exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on profitability for the 
equations without the regional dummies. When statistically significant, both OPEX and LIQ 
exhibit the expected signs. Per capita income PCY never exerts an effect statistically different 
from zero. For the equations without regional dummies, population growth PP exerts the 
expected positive and statistically significant impact on profitability. The impact from 
commercial banks per capita CBP is never statistically different from zero. Both dummies DI 
and D2 carry expected and statistically significant signs. Inclusion of the dummies cancels the 
effects of LIQ and PP on profitability and suggests that their effects are captured in regional 
21 An alternative measure, commercial banks unscaled by population, had an effect on profitability that was 
consistently insignificant from zero, and did not significantly alter the other variables' coeffcients and 
significance levels. 
22 This expectation is consistent with the studies Kaufman (1966), Rhoades (1979). Spellman (1981). and 
Marlow (1982) which find competitive interactions between savings and loans and commercial banks in 
estimations of market structure-performance relations. 
2.1 As pointed out by a referee, continuous variables are preferable to dichotomous when it is unlikely that 
effects are not uniform across broad regions of the country. However, in our study we expect that several 
variables may be successfully measured on a broad regional basis. For example, firm portfolio composition and 
growth, demographics of the population and exogenous shocks such as oil "crises" all affect housing demand 
and finance on a regional basis. For simplicity, we chose to measure the general influence of these variables on 
profitability through dichotomous measures rather than separate continuous measures. MoreovcT. such 
measurement is within our resources. 
Table 1. Regression Results for Equations with Static Market Structure ( T-Statistics Are Shown Below 
Estimated Coefficients) 
Market Structure Variable 
CR3 CR3 H H 
Intercept 0.008 b 0.009" 0.009' 0.009' 
(2.28) (2.59) (2.57) (2.67) 
OPEX -0.009 -0.370b -0.004 -0.3671> 
(- 0.05) ( - 1.94) (- 0.02) ( - I.92) 
LIQ -0.021 u -0.005 - 0.022 u - 0.005 
( - 1.55) ( - 0.37) (- 1.60) ( -0.39) 
Dl 0.004" 0.004' 
(4.19) (4.18) 
D2 -0.003' -0.003" 
(-2.51) ( - 2.49) 
PCY 1.7E-07 1.9E-07 I.3E-O? 1.9E-07 
(0.55) (0.65) (0.44) (0.66) 
pp 0.011 r 0.004 0.011' 0.004 
(3.44) (1.26) (3.45) (1.25) 
CBP 1.0E-06 0.013 8.0E-0? 0.012 
(0.28) (I. 10) (0.21) ( 1.09) 
Market Structure -0.001 -0.001 -O.CXJ3 -0.001 
( - 0.45) ( - 0.29) (- 0.92) ( -0.27) 
F 2.67 b 5.72" 2.791> 5.71 " 
0.11 0.28 0.11 0.28 
a Significant at 10% level.
 
h Significant at 5 % level.
 
" Significant at I % level.
 
CR3 ~ Three-firm concentration ratio.
 
H = Herfindahl index.
 
differences. Static measures of structure, CR3 or H, never exert impacts on profitability that 
are significantly different from zero. 
Table 2 displays the regression results for equations with dynamic measures of market 
structure. The results for OPEX, LIQ, DI, D2, PCY, and PP mirror the results displayed in 
Table 1. Commercial banks per capita CBP displays a positive and statistically significant 
sign in only two of eight equations. While the sign is contrary to expectations, the significance 
level is only 10% in those two cases. Neither of the changes in static measures DCR3 or DH 
display an effect statistically different from zero. However, both of our dynamic measures M 
and T exert the expected negative and statistically significant impacts on profitability for 
equations with and without the regional dummies. 24 
24 One referee has suggested that by definition, mobility and turnover wi)) tend to be higher, simply by 
chance, when the number of firms in an industry is large. Consequently, our results may indicate that profits fall 
as the number of firms in the market increases. However, additional tests indicate that the number of firms is 
not important per se. Replacing our selected measures of competition with various measures of number of firms 
(number of savings and loans per capita and number of savings and loans) did not indicate any significant 
influence on profitability. In addition, simple correlation coefficients between mobility and turnover and the 
number of firms proved to be not significantly different from zero. 
Table 2, Regression Results for Equations with Dynamie Market Structure (T-Statistics Are Shown Below Estimated Coefficients) 
--_. 
Market Structure Variable 
OCR3 DRO DH DH M3 M3 T3 T3 
--------"- ---
Inlercepl O,OO7b 0.009' O,OO7 b 0,009' 0,007' O,OO7b 0.007' 0.008' 
(2,07) (2.70) (2,05) (2,66) (2,52) (2.33) (2,46) (2.61) 
OPEX -0.032 -0.361 b -0.021 -0.36b 0.020 -O,28Ob 0,003 -0.341 b 
( -0.16) (- 1.88) (-0.11) (-1.86) (0,12) (-1.59) (0.02) (-1.89) 
LIQ	 -0.021' -0.005 -0.021' -0.005 -0.010 0,008 -0.02 0,001 
(-1.43) (-0.39) (-1.46) ( -0,39) (-0.71) (0,62) (-1.18) (0,08) 
D1	 0.004' 0.004' 0.004' 0,004' 
(4.24) (4.22) (4,38)	 (4,66) 
ill	 -0.003' -0.003' -0.003' -0.003' 
(-2.43) (-2.55) (-2.72) ( -2.60) 
pcy	 2.IE-m 2,OE-m 2.0E..Q7 2.IE-m 1.5E-m 2.4E'{)7 1.9E.{)7 2.2E-m 
(0.65) (0.68) (0.65) (0.72) (0.57) (0.94) (0.68) (0,83) 
PP	 0.011' 0.004 O.OW 0,004 0.012' O.OO5b 0.011' 0.004" 
(3.26) (1.24) (3,28) (1.21) (4,06) (1.83) (3.77) (1.48) 
CBP	 0,007 0.013 0,007 0.013 9.0E-m 0,017" 2,OE-n6 0.015" 
(0,55) (1.12) (0.59) (1.12) (0.26) (1.60) (0.44) (1.42) 
Market 
Structure -0.001 0.003 0.002 0,003 -0.001' -0,001' -0.002' -0.002' 
(-0,07) (0,32) (0,36) (0.59) (4.70) ( -5.09) (-2.98) (-3,60) 
F	 2,59b 5.72' 2.61" 5.76' 6.76' 10.22' 4.30' 7.96' 
R' 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.29 0,24 0.42 0,17 0.36 
--_ ..__._---------------
---------- --_. 
II Signiftcance at 10% level. 
• Significance at 5% level. 
~ Significance at I% level. 
OCR) = Change in three-finn concenttarion mtio. 
DH = Change in HerfindahJ index. 
M3 = = Mobility. 
n ;;;; Turnover. 
Tables 3 and 4 display the regression results for equations which include both static and 
dynamic measures of market structure, to control for the ability of firms to alter market 
positions. That is, competition may be affected by the size of market shares of the largest 
firms. Static measures of structure reflect the traditional hypothesis that they reflect the 
monopoly power of firms which, in tum, influences the ability of firms to alter market 
positions and ultimately their profitability. Dynamic measures reflect the recent level of 
structural change in the market. For reasons of brevity, only those equations including the 
regional dummies are displayed; however, the results mirror the results displayed in Tables 1 
and 2 for equations with and without regional dummies. 
In no case do the static measures of structure (CR3 and H) exert an impact on profitability 
which is statistically different from zero. Neither of the changes in static measures of structure 
(DCR3 and DH) display statistically significant impacts on profitability. As in Tables 1 and 
Table 3. Regression Results for Equations with Static and Dynamic Market Structure (T-Statistics Are 
Shown Below Estimated Coefficients) 
--- --~~-~'---------------'--'-'--'----'----
Static: CR3 
DCR3 DH M3 T3 
- ---._--- -----_._---_.._-----..._-----------._------­
Intercept 0.009< 0.009< 0.008< 0.009' 
(2.57) (2.57) (2.55) (2.68) 
OPEX - 0.362 b - 0.356 b -2.73 a - 0.341 b 
(- 1.87) ( - 1.85) (- 1.57) (- 1.88) 
L1Q -0.005 -0.005 0.009 0.001 
(- 0.38) ( -0.38) (0.68) (0.11) 
Dl 0.004' 0.004' 0.003' 0.004' 
(4.16) (4.14) (4.22) (4.54) 
D2 -0.003' - 0.003' - 0.003' -0.003' 
(- 2.44) (- 2.56) (-2.79) (- 2.63) 
PCY 1.8E-07 1.9E-07 1.9E-07 1.8E-07 
(0.62) (0.64) (0.72) (0.67) 
PP 0.004 0.004 0.006b 0.005 a 
(1.26) (1.24) (1.99) (1.58) 
CBP 0.013 0.013 o.ona 0.016a 
(1.12) (1.13) (1.64) (1.44) 
Static CR3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
( -0.26) ( -0.33) (- 1.04) ( -0.74) 
Dynamic Market 0.002 0.004 -0.001 ' - 0.002' 
Structure (0.29) (0.61) (-5.19) (- 3.65) 
F 5.05< 5.09< 9.21 < 7.1 I ' 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.42 0.36 
._-_.­
Q Significance at 10 % level. 
b Significance at 5% level. 
, Significance at I % level. 
CRS = Three-finn concentration ratio.
 
nCR3 = Change in CR3.
 
M3 ~ Mobility.
 
T3 = Turnover.
 
Table 4. Regression Results for Equations with Static and Dynamic Market Structure ( T-Statistics Are 
Shown Below Estimated Coefficients) 
• ____._--______0. ____._ ••• 
Static: H 
DCR3 DH M3 T3 
Intercept	 0.009' 0.009' O.OOS' 0.009' 
(2.66) (2.65) (2.46) (2.63) 
OPEX	 - 0.360" -0.352" - 0.266" -0.337" 
( - 1.86) ( - 1.83) ( - 1.53) ( - 1.85) 
LIQ -0.006 -0.006 0.008 0.001 
(- 0.40) ( -0.41) (0.59) (0.05) 
DI	 0.004' 0.004' 0.003' 0.004' 
(4.14) (4.12) (4.22) (4.55) 
D2	 -0.003' - 0.003' - 0.003' -0.003' 
( - 2.42) ( - 2.54) (- 2.70) ( - 2.58) 
PCY	 1.8E-07 1.9E-07 2.IE-07 2.0E-07 
(0.63) (0.65) (0.79) (0.74) 
PP	 0.004 0.004 0.006" 0.005 a 
(1.26) (1.24) (I. 92) (1.52) 
CBP	 0.013 0.013 0.017" 0.015" 
(1.11) (1.I 2) (1.61) (1.42) 
Static H 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
( -0.24) ( - 0.35) (- 0.83) (- 0.47) 
Dynamic Market 0.002 0.004 -0.001' -0.002' 
Structure (0.29) (0.63) (-5.14) (-3.61) 
F	 5.05' 5.10' 9.14' 7.05' 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.42 0.36 
._-----_._-- -- .. --_ .. __._-----­
----------"-------­
a Significance at 10% level. 
h Significance at 5 % level. 
,. Signiticance at 1% level. 
H = Herfindahl index. 
DCR3 = Change in three-firm concentration ratio. 
DH = Change in H. 
M3 = Mobility. 
T3 = Turnover. 
2, the coefficients on M and T display negative signs which are statistically different from 
zero at the 0.01 level or better. Therefore, controlling traditional measures of concentration 
does not appear to influence the effects of mobility and turnover on profitability. 
VI. Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
Our message is that levels and changes in static indicators of concentration may offer 
misleading measures of market competition. In the savings and loan idustry, it may not matter 
much if the largest finns have a large market share, as long as there is active competition 
among them for position and/or there is potential movement in and out of the top three 
positions. 
A policy implication is that traditional static measures of structure in market structure­
perfonnance studies are apt to be misleading. The implication for the usefulness of recent 
work in developing full-distribution static indexes also carries the same conclusion. These 
implications follow from the problems of standardization and interpretation associated with 
the various static measures of concentration. The empirical findings of this paper support 
recent theoretical research which argues that challenges to the dominant core of finns from de 
novo entrants and existing outgroup members is of primary importance to the maintenance of 
market power. The implication for regulatory analysis is that more research should be 
directed at studying dynamic structure measures when considering applications for mergers, 
acquisitions, or de novo entry. 
We suggest two possible avenues for future research. One, further development of 
measures of dynamic structure will aid our understanding of how evolving market processes 
affect market perfonnance. At best, our measures of dynamic structure are first approxima­
tions and could be improved by developing full distribution measures which exclude arbitrary 
numbers of finns considered (e.g., largest five) and are standardized for differing numbers of 
finns in small markets. Two, research on the relations between static and dynamic measures 
of structure is needed. Such research could provide more infonnation on the relative 
usefulness of static and dynamic measures in fonnulating public policy. 
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